escudo iraq transparente


Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi announced the opening of the Green Zone

in Baghdad for 24 hours

Location Green Zone, Baghdad  
Incident summary On Sunday, Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi announced the opening of the Green Zone in Baghdad to citizens for 24 hours during public holidays.  


Anti-terrorism forces raided and destroyed an ISIS HQ in a desert area in west


Location Desert area, western Ninawa  
Incident summary Anti-terrorism forces raided and destroyed an ISIS HQ in a desert area in west Ninawa on Saturday afternoon. In the same operations, several ISIS militants were killed and arrested.  


ISIS gunmen opened fire at civilians near Daquq, killing a young man and

injuring another

Location Sheikh Mahmoud village, near Daquq  
Incident Summary  

ISIS gunmen opened fire at civilians in Sheikh Mahmoud village, near Daquq late on Friday, killing a young man and injuring another.
ISIS attacked and killed a federal police and a PMU leader northeast of Baiji
Location Tal ad Dahab village, northeast of Baiji  
Incident summary ISIS attacked and killed a federal policeman and a PMU leader while the two were inspecting Tal ad Dahab village, northeast of Baiji on Saturday afternoon.  

How a Trained Interrogator Effectively Exploits a Terrorist Detainee Part 1

Over the last almost two decades of counterinsurgency in Southwest Asia, thousands of terrorist and insurgents have been captured on the battlefield. Additionally, terrorists have been captured all over the world from the Philippine Islands in the Pacific region, to Somalia in East Africa.

Removing a terrorist from the battlefield is important. Equally important is effectively interrogating a terrorist with the goal of gaining accurate information of intelligence value.

The Western world has had many healthy debates on the treatment of detainees. One of the most common debates has been on the tactics, techniques and procedures relating to the interrogation of detainees. While there have been a few cases of mistreatment of detainees by military personnel which have made global news, the perpetrators of which have rightly been punished according to applicable law, the overwhelming majority of interrogations have been conducted in accordance with the Law of War (LoW) and Geneva Conventions (GC).

During my own training as an interrogator, and my subsequent 3 year tenure as a senior instructor of military interrogators, substantive, required, formal training was provided on the content and non-negotiability of both the LoW and GC to all future interrogators. The training is always conducted by Judge Advocate General military attorneys. During the extensive role playing training that military interrogators go through, a Law of War violation is an automatic failure.

Despite the importance the Western world attaches to the Law of War and Geneva Conventions in the treatment of detainees, there are still several common myths surrounding interrogation which persist.

During my online research and the following of this longstanding public debate, I have come across the widely held perception that the military interrogator’s goal during interrogation is to get the detainee to say what the interrogator wants to hear – to get a confession. It is the perception that this goal encourages the interrogator to use whatever means necessary, including torture, in order to accomplish that goal.

The sensationalized portrayal of interrogations in movies and television often provide additional support to this perception.

This perception is in fact the opposite of the truth. The goal of an interrogator is to gain information that is complete, truthful and accurate. The lives of people are literally at stake. As I will show in this and subsequent articles, the method by which this is accomplished is a carefully thought out and explicitly doctrinally defined methodology that has been proven and refined over nearly two decades during the Global War on Terror as being the best way to gain accurate intelligence, while remaining compliant with the Law of War and Geneva Conventions.

It is worthy of note that the Geneva Conventions make a distinction between an Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) and an Unlawful Enemy Combatant (UEC), and provides for differences in the rights accorded to each category of detainee. Despite this provision, the United States military has decided to provide all the rights of an EPW to UEC’s.

Another common misperception that is advocated by many public figures surrounds the use and effectiveness of torture.

By international law, and US policy, torture is prohibited when interrogating terrorist detainees. It has been my experience that, in practice, interrogators not only do NOT cross the line into techniques that could be considered torture, they are prohibited by policy from any activities that even come close to that line. I fully support this default position as a matter of morality, policy and practice.

However, a related misperception concerns the utilitarian argument against torture that asserts there is no circumstance under which torture could lead to information of intelligence value that is truthful and accurate, because the detainee would be willing to tell the interrogator anything that he thinks the interrogator wants to hear, in order to make the torture stop.

This position is held by many National Security opinion makers, legislators, activists, and senior military leaders. It’s a position that I understand.

However, there a few elements contained in the discussion regarding the utilitarian argument that some believe have been insufficiently attended to.

First, as one who has closely followed this debate for over a decade, I have yet to come across a universally agreed to, all encompassing, specific definition of torture that is sufficient in forming a definitive conclusion as to the utility of torture in interrogation methods. Many techniques can be universally be agreed upon to constitute torture as they cause severe pain and suffering – waterboarding, beatings, prolonged sensory deprivation, starvation, and the like. It is methods of torture similar to these that are usually mentioned in the debate.

The United Nations Convention against Torture does provide a definition of torture, but many see the definition as being overly broad and insufficient to cover every operational circumstance.

Other specific, conceivable techniques upon which there might not be universal agreement about whether or not they constitute torture are, for instance, having the detainee do pushups to muscle failure, stress positions, running sprints to exhaustion until vomiting, being blasted in the face with cold water from a high pressure hose, etc. Many involved in this debate consider these acts to cause severe pain and suffering, and to therefore constitute torture. Others do not consider these techniques to cause severe pain and suffering, and therefore do not consider them to be torture. Military doctrine currently disallows the use of these techniques on detainees.

*I am not advocating for any of the techniques listed above.

My purpose is discussing these techniques is to explore the possible utility of these doctrinally prohibited techniques under hypothetical conditions.

Many National Security figures, politicians and activists claim that these physically coercive techniques can NEVER work, as I pointed out previously, because the detainee will say anything to make them stop, thereby giving the interrogator false information.

I believe the binary scenario envisioned by such figures doesn’t account for all the different types of scenarios under which an interrogation can take place. For example, if an interrogator is facing a detainee for the first time, and does NOT have access to previously collected intelligence on the terrorist, the ability to reach back personally or via colleagues to other operationally tested informants knowledgeable about the detainee who can corroborate what the detainee says, a profile of the detainee’s psychosocial history, knowledge of the streets from where the detainee has come, who he knows, people of influence in his life, past terrorist acts, his circumstances of capture, access to the document exploitation resulting from the capture, and doesn’t have already have a good idea of the knowledgeability of the terrorist, then the interrogation is taking place in a vacuum, with no way to corroborate the terrorist’s statements.

If the interrogator has no “control questions” (questions the interrogator already knows the answers to), and no skills or training in deception detection, then the interrogator has no way of ascertaining the truthfulness and accuracy of the detainee’s statements.

If, under the circumstances described above where none of this is in place, the interrogator resorts to coercive methods, including torture, I would question the veracity of any intelligence reporting produced as a result of this interrogation.

However, if all of the elements described above are in place and, at certain points of resistance in an interrogation, a physically coercive method is used or even proposed to the detainee when the interrogator reaches a point where the detainee has started to be verifiably deceptive, it is hypothetically feasible that more coercive techniques could be used to break through the resistance.

In other words, there are possibly some circumstances under which carefully selected coercive techniques could have utility in the collection of intelligence during an interrogation, if all of the above abilities and information are available to the interrogator. Many believe this more nuanced view of coercive techniques is more accurate than the binary view presented in movies and on television in which suspects quickly give accurate information in response to coercive techniques, and the opposite extreme proposed by activists in which coercive techniques can never lead to accurate intelligence.

My goal is not to advocate the use or morality of torture. My discussion is limited to exploring the claims of those who say it can never have utility because it will always lead to false confessions and inaccurate information, versus the possibility, under certain circumstances, that coercive methods could facilitate the collection of intelligence that is truthful, accurate, and able to be corroborated, that otherwise would not be obtained, and that would not lead to false confessions.

In subsequent articles I will discuss the mechanics of interrogation, describing how proper planning and preparation prior to an interrogation can give the interrogator a profile that can guide rapport building, psychological approaches, and deception detection techniques that will maximize the collection of truthful and accurate intelligence.

The Global War on Terror continues. The debate on coercive interrogation techniques has been had, and I suspect will continue.

© S.R. Mogck for De Angelis & Associates 2019

Deputy Team Leader, MOZAMBIQUE.

Employer: Control Risks
Location Pemba, Cabo Delgado, Mozambique
Engagement – Rotational, 6 weeks on, 6 weeks off

Job Purpose
The Deputy Team Leader provides armed protection security for this client contract in Mozambique. They are responsible for maintaining the highest standards of team presentation and capability to the client. They are to be fully compliant with Control Risks’ SOPs at all time and works with his colleagues to deliver the best possible service to the client.
Tasks and responsibilities
} Demonstrates client etiquette, discipline and Control Risks’ low profile approach;
} Possesses up to date knowledge of threat and key issues in Mozambique.
} Conducts Vehicle and Dismounted Contact and Immediate Action Drills.
} Possesses competent Navigation skills including map, compass and use of GPS.
} Competent in the use of all communications systems both vehicles mounted and hand held.
} Able to be fully conversant and comply with Rules of Engagement and Use of Force.
} Maintains competence in these skills through regular formal assessment.
} Conducts effective administration to include vehicle maintenance, equipment husbandry/accountability and reports and returns.
} Assists in the conduct of risk assessments and operational planning.
} Issues orders to team members and briefs clients in line with SOPs when required.
} Conducts venue and route recces and produces reports.
} Command the team and issue direction to clients.

Knowledge and experience
} Minimum 12 months APT experience.
} Minimum 4 years military / police experience.
} Minimum 2 years commercial experience in a hostile environment
} Fluent in English
} To be able to deploy immediately / no notice period

} Experience managing operations for O&G clients.
} Experience managing local guard force.
} Experience working for Control Risks in Southern Mozambique.
} Fluent in Portuguese

Qualifications and specialist skills
} If not from a country where English is the official language, the candidate will provide proof (dated within the last 2 years) of language ability based on the British Council Language Exam board.
} Valid and in date SIA Frontline Close Protection Certificate accredited by OfQual
} Valid and in date certificate for FPOS-I Level 4 and/or FREC Level 3
} Police Certificate / DBS or CRB
} Military records
} HECPO qualified preferable.
All employees are expected to display behaviours reflective of our company values: Integrity and Ethics, Collaboration and Teamwork, Commitment to People and Professionalism and Excellence.

All employees are expected to display behaviours reflective of our company values: Integrity and Ethics, Collaboration and Teamwork, Commitment to People and Professionalism and Excellence

How to apply
If your qualifications, experience and aspirations match our requirements please email a covering letter and C.V., stating ‘Application – Deputy Team Leader’ as the subject title of your email application and flag it as highly important to:
Along with your CV please send through the following qualifications;
– Sia License
– FPOS-I / FREC / AoFAQ certificate
– Close Protection Certificate
– Passport and passport photo
– Police certificate
– Confirmation on whether you speak Portuguese
If the qualifications meet our criteria I will then arrange for to conduct a short phone screen interview with you. Your CV will then be passed to our management team for final sign off, at which point we will confirm the next steps.
Due to a high demand I cannot guarantee a response to all candidates, I’ll be in contact should we wish to shortlist your application.

Far-right terrorism threat is growing, say MI5 and police chiefs

Armed police
Police have stopped a number of potential rightwing terrorist attacks since 2017. Photograph: Dan Kitwood/Getty Images

Far-right terrorism has been identified as a key threat to the safety and prosperity of the country, according to the director general of MI5, Andrew Parker, and Cressida Dick, the commissioner of the Metropolitan police.

Writing in the Times, the pair warned that while Islamist terrorism remains the largest by scale, they are also “concerned about the growing threat from other forms of violent extremism … covering a spectrum of hate-driven ideologies, including the extreme right and left.”

“Over the past few years [police] have stopped a number of rightwing terrorist attacks from getting through,” they wrote.

In the wake of the Christchurch attacks, in which 50 Muslims were killed by a suspected white supremacist, security services worldwide have refocused on the threat of far-right extremists.

Sara Khan, the UK’s lead anti-extremism commissioner, told the Observer this month there has been a surge of UK-based far-right activists who are “organised, professional and actively attempting to recruit”.

How Ukip normalised far-right politics – video explainer

Khan, who is preparing a report on extremism for the home secretary, said: “I have heard deep concern about the far right and its devastating impact on individuals, communities and our democracy.” She also said that a “frightening amount of legal extremist content online” was fuelling far-right activism.

Elsewhere in their article, Parker and Dick said “numerous plots” had been thwarted in the UK since terror attacks in 2017 in London and Manchester. After those attacks, the pair had commissioned Lord Anderson to write an independent review into them.

The report highlighted three key themes: the need to counter violent groups on the extreme right and left; how the security services and the police use data; and the need for intelligence sharing at local level with other organisations.

“On data, we identified ways in which advances in that field enable us to sharpen our ‘radar’ and increase insight,” they wrote. “There is no magic solution but there are valuable gains to be made by going further in data analytics and related technologies with parts of the private sector. We have made important progress already.”

The use of behavioural science will allow agencies to “detect signs of developing intent”. Allied with information-sharing across multiple agencies, including social services, “this approach to managing the risk in communities posed by individuals linked to violent extremism can succeed where a more active, intrusive investigation might not”.

Several pilot projects are already running on this model, which could soon be rolled out across the UK. It is similar to how some authorities manage sexual and violent offenders.

Russian deployment in Venezuela includes special forces

A Russian military contingent that arrived in Venezuela over the weekend, drawing US condemnation, is believed by the US government to be made up of special forces including “cybersecurity personnel”, a US official said.The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the United States was still assessing the Russian deployment, which Washington has called a “reckless escalation” of the situation in Venezuela.

Two Russian air force planes landed outside Caracas on Saturday carrying nearly 100 Russian troops, according to local media reports, two months after the administration of US President Donald Trump disavowed Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.Venezuela’s government has confirmed two planes landed from Russia at the weekend and were authorised by Maduro but has given no more details.

Flight tracking websites said the planes, an Ilyushin IL-62 passenger jet and an Antonov AN-124 military cargo plane, had taken off from Russian military airports.One of them had flown from Moscow via Syria, where Russia supports President Bashar al-Assad.

The Trump administration has recognised opposition leader Juan Guaido as the country’s legitimate president and demands that Maduro step down. Russia has described this as a US-backed coup against the socialist government.The US determination that the Russian contingent includes cybersecurity specialists suggests that part of their mission could be helping Maduro’s loyalists with surveillance as well as protection of the government’s cyber infrastructure.Russia’s main objective in providing the military help, including cyber experts, would likely be to help shield Maduro from “regime change” and ensure a foothold for Moscow in Latin America, according to a source familiar with US government assessments of Venezuela.

Russia also has major energy investments in OPEC member Venezuela. In December, Russia sent two nuclear-capable long range bombers to Venezuela for several days to participate in what it said were joint exercises. Russia’s foreign ministry said on Tuesday that the presence of “Russian specialists” in Venezuela was governed by a military-technical cooperation agreement between the two countries.It did not provide further details.

However, Sputnik, a Russian state news outlet, cited unnamed embassy officials in Caracas to report that troops and 35 tonnes of cargo under the command of General Vasily Tonkoshkurov arrived to “exchange consultations”.