BAGHDAD December 31. 2023 (Saba) – A drone belonging to the Iraqi resistance factions targeted, with two missiles, the American “Kharab al-Jir” airport base in the Hasakah countryside in Syria.
Al-Mayadeen reported, citing field sources, on Sunday that the American “Rumaylan” base in northeastern Syria was also bombed by drones.
On Saturday, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq announced several operations targeting American bases in Syria and Iraq, in continuation of its approach to resisting the American enemy forces in the region, as well as in response to the crimes of the ongoing Zionist aggression against Gaza, which enjoys Washington’s support, according to its statements.
The resistance confirmed that it targeted the American “Harir” base, located in Erbil, northern Iraq, with drones, and published scenes documenting this targeting. It also targeted the American bases of Al-Shaddadi and Kharab Al-Jir, deep in Syria, with missile attacks.
A few days ago, the Iraqi resistance confirmed that it had struck a vital target in the “Eliad” settlement, south of occupied Palestine, with appropriate weapons. It also targeted a technical spy center affiliated with the Zionist entity near Erbil.
For his part, a military official in the US Department of Defense (the Pentagon) told Al-Mayadeen, saying: The number of attacks on American forces in Syria and Iraq has reached at least 106 attacks, since the 17th of last October.
Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 30, 2023, 6:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on December 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a large series of strikes against targets in Russia on the night of December 29 to 30 and on December 30. Ukrainian security sources told Western and Ukrainian media that Ukrainian forces launched more than 70 drones on the night of December 29 to 30 at Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial facilities near Moscow, Belgorod, Tula, Tver, and Bryansk cities.[1] The Ukrainian security sources reportedly characterized these strikes as a response to the Russian strikes on December 29, which was the largest series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted 32 Ukrainian drones in Bryansk, Orel, Kursk, and Moscow oblasts on the night of December 29 to 30.[3] The discrepancy between these Russian and Ukrainian figures may suggest that Ukrainian forces struck many of their intended targets, as Ukrainian security sources suggested to Western and Ukrainian media.[4] Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the Kreminy El Plant in Bryansk City, which is Russia’s second largest producer of microelectronics, 90 percent of whose manufactured products are reportedly components of Russian military equipment and systems.[5] Geolocated footage published on December 30 shows explosions over Bryansk City.[6] The Russian MoD stated that Russian air defenses shot down 12 Ukrainian MLRS rockets in Belgorod Oblast on December 29 and several more Ukrainian MLRS rockets near Belgorod City during the day on December 30.[7] Ukrainian security sources reportedly told Western and Ukrainian media that the Ukrainian strikes on December 30 targeted Russian military targets near Belgorod City.[8]
Russian forces conducted a lower number of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on December 30 following the large Russian strike series on December 29. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched 10 Shahed-136/-131 drones at targets in southern Ukraine, an Iskander-M missile at Zaporizhzhia City, an unspecified number of Kh-59 missiles at Dnipro and Odesa cities, and six unspecified missiles at Kharkiv City.[9] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted five of the drones, the Iskander-M missile, and one of the Kh-59 missiles.[10] Russian forces reportedly struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City, an enterprise in Odesa City, and the office of the Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner in Kherson City.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 30 that the December 29 Russian strike series killed 39 people and wounded 159 and impacted hundreds of civilian objects.[12] The Economist reported on December 29 that a source in Ukraine’s defense industry stated that Russian strikes on December 29 predominately targeted defense industrial facilities in Ukraine, including those connected to Ukrainian missile and drone production.[13] Russian strikes against Ukrainian defense industrial facilities likely mean to prevent Ukraine from developing key capacities to sustain operations for a longer war effort and disrupt Ukrainian efforts to seek Western partnerships for joint production in Ukraine.[14]
Russian officials continued to clearly state that Russia is not interested in negotiating with Ukraine or the West in good faith and intends to achieve its maximalist objectives in Ukraine. Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mikhail Galuzin stated in an interview with Russian state outlet RIA Novosti on December 30 that Russia will agree to a settlement when Ukraine is “neutral, non-aligned, and nuclear-free,” “demilitariz[ed],” and “denazi[fied]” — long-standing Russian demands for Ukraine’s exclusion from NATO and EU membership, the removal of Ukraine’s ability to defend its land and its people, and the replacement of the current elected Ukrainian government with a Kremlin-accepted government.[15] Galuzin also reiterated the Kremlin narrative that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky — and not Russian President Vladimir Putin — is to blame for the absence of negotiations and claimed that Zelensky’s proposed peace plan “has nothing to do with peace” but “justif[ies] the continuation of hostilities.” Galuzin claimed that Russia has never refused to engage in dialogue with Ukraine, but that Russia has “no choice” but to complete all its “assigned tasks” — Russia’s maximalist objectives — in Ukraine.
The Kremlin’s recent public rhetoric about its maximalist objectives and imperial designs in Ukraine are permeating the Russian information space. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on December 30 that Western media is disseminating “rumors” about negotiations that would end the war in Ukraine by giving Russia unspecified parts of Ukrainian territory.[16] The milblogger stated that Russia is not interested in such “limited proposals,” suggesting that the milblogger believes that Russia’s war objectives extend beyond its currently occupied territory. The milblogger also claimed that Ukraine is not yet sufficiently demoralized and “exhausted” to accept a “catastrophic capitulation,” suggesting that the milblogger believes that Russia should only accept such a “catastrophic [Ukrainian] capitulation” and is calling on Russia to achieve these maximalist objectives in part through psychological means. Russian sources specifically amplified Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev’s labelling of Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Kyiv as “Russian cities” on December 28. The prominent milblogger claimed on December 30 that the war will end when Ukraine allows Russia to take Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and other Ukrainian oblasts.[17] Former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia Spokesperson Eduard Basurin claimed on December 30 that Russia’s task for the war in Ukraine was previously “blurry” and ”there was no understanding of where [Russian] borders should stop” but Medvedev’s statement makes it clear that Russia has determined that its borders should allow for ”complete [Russian] control“ of the Black Sea and should include Kyiv.[18] Basurin called Kyiv “the capital of [Russia’s] large empire” and the birthplace of Russian Orthodoxy and the word “Rus” (in reference to Kyivan Rus). Basurin’s statements echo those of Putin, who featured similar claims in his July 2021 “Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” essay and who has recently reverted to narratives about Kyivan Rus as part of the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir) to frame Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a historically justified imperial reconquest.[19]
Russia continues to set information conditions aimed at destabilizing Moldova by framing Russia as a protector of allegedly threatened Russian-language speakers in Moldova. Russian state news wire TASS reported on December 27 that 19.1 percent of school children in Moldova choose to receive educational instruction in the Russian language.[20] TASS claimed that the Moldovan government’s refusal to recognize Russian as a state language in 1989 led to the war in Transnistria and the conflict with Gagauzia.[21] TASS further claimed that the ruling pro-European Moldovan Party of Action and Solidarity is exacerbating these alleged long-standing language divides by failing to grant Russian language the status of “a language of interethnic communication.”[22] Russian forces have occupied Transnistria since 1992, and Russia has continually supported pro-Russian actors in Moldova to promote political instability and division.[23] Claims that the Party of Action and Solidarity is threating Russian speakers in Moldova allow Russia to frame any potential Russian support for pro-Kremlin actors in Moldova as a humanitarian attempt to protect Russian speakers instead of an attempt to politically destabilize Moldova itself. The Kremlin used exactly this line of argument as one of the bases for its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[24] Russia is likely attempting to justify any future actions in Moldova as an attempt to protect its “compatriots abroad,” a term that Russia has broadly defined to mean ethnic Russians and Russian speakers outside of Russia regardless of their citizenship. Russia continues to justify its invasion of Ukraine, in part, by claiming Russia is protecting its “compatriots” in Ukraine and their right to use Russian language and will likely continue to use this narrative when discussing any future Russian attempts at imperial reconquests.[25]
Russia continues attempts to actively shape the Western information space to support Russian positions and undermine support for Ukraine while portraying these efforts as endogenous to the West. The Washington Post reported on December 30 that it obtained Kremlin documents from an unspecified European security service that show that Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko oversees Kremlin operations to undermine support for Ukraine and NATO in the French information space and through French politicians and activists.[26] The Kremlin documents reportedly listed specific narratives that the Kremlin sought to promote in France including arguments that Western sanctions against Russia have harmed the French economy, that the provision of French weapons supplies to Ukraine has degraded France’s ability to defend itself, that continuous support for Ukraine would lead to World War III, and that France should not fund a foreign war.[27] The Kremlin documents also reportedly show that Kremlin political strategists instructed a Russian troll farm employee to write a “200-character comment by a middle-aged French person” arguing that European support for Ukraine is a “stupid adventure” and that continued support for Ukraine is increasing inflation and lowering living standards.[28]
The Washington Post also reported that a six-month French government inquiry found that “Russia is conducting a long-term disinformation campaign in [France] to defend and promote Russian interests and to polarize [French] democratic society.”[29] The inquiry highlighted French far-right party National Rally’s links to the Kremlin and National Rally Party member and French politician Thierry Mariani’s continued pro-Russian positions.[30] Mariani, previously under investigation for Russia-related corruption, is the Co-Chair of the Russian government-founded French think tank, the Franco-Russian Dialogue Association.[31] Russia reportedly employs similar information tactics in Ukraine, the West, and worldwide. The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Laboratory (DFRLab) and the BBC’s Verify project recently found that Russian actors created thousands of fake accounts aimed at defaming former Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov and connected the effort to a previous Russian information campaign to discredit Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi in early 2023.[32] Independent social media monitor Graphika also found that Russian actors generated online content designed to appear as domestically generated to reduce Western support for NATO ahead of the July 2023 NATO summit.[33]
The Russian Ministry Foreign Affairs (MFA) emphasized Russia’s improving diplomatic relations with non-Western countries in way that suggests that the Kremlin is insecure about the possibility of diplomatic isolation against the backdrop of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Russian MFA published a list on December 30 outlining its accomplishments in gaining political and diplomatic support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and expanding cooperation with countries and associations of the “world majority.”[34] Russia has previously defined the “world majority” as “a civilizational and cultural community that objectively opposes” the West and alleged that the world is divided into two camps: countries that support the United States and Ukraine and countries that are neutral or support Russia.[35] The MFA cited several accomplishments, such as improving relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America; having Sino-Russian relations reach an “unprecedented level”; bringing the Russian–North Korean relations to a new level; and developing Russian–Iranian relations. The MFA also claimed that Russia thwarted Western attempts to isolate Russia, responded to NATO’s and the European Union’s expansion, and withdrew from a series of treaties. It notably did not identify the expansion of NATO and the EU as the defeats for Russian diplomacy that they were. The Russian MFA has been trying recently to establish new diplomatic relations with African countries and even reopened its embassy in Burkina Faso for the first time since 1992 on December 28.[36] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a bill in August committing Russia to reopen its embassy in Equatorial Guinea.[37] MFA Deputy Minister Yevgeny Ivanov announced on December 25 that Russia is planning to open additional embassies and diplomatic missions and claimed that while Western countries sent hundreds of Russian diplomats home, these diplomats were able to find other jobs within the MFA network.[38]
Key Takeaways:
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a large series of strikes against targets in Russia on the night of December 29 to 30 and on December 30.
Russian forces conducted a lower number of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on December 30 following the large Russian strike series on December 29.
Russian officials continued to clearly state that Russia is not interested in negotiating with Ukraine or the West in good faith and intends to achieve its maximalist objectives in Ukraine.
The Kremlin’s recent public rhetoric about its maximalist objectives and imperial designs in Ukraine are permeating the Russian information space.
Russia continues to set information conditions aimed at destabilizing Moldova by framing Russia as a protector of allegedly threatened Russian-language speakers in Moldova.
Russia continues attempts to actively shape the Western information space to support Russian positions and undermine support for Ukraine while portraying these efforts as endogenous to the West.
The Russian Ministry Foreign Affairs (MFA) emphasized Russia’s improving diplomatic relations with non-Western countries in way that suggests that the Kremlin is insecure about the possibility of diplomatic isolation against the backdrop of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Russian forces made confirmed gains near Kreminna, Bakhmut and Avdiivka as positional engagements continued along the entire line of contact.
The Russian military command reportedly continued the dissolution of the “Kaskad” operational combat tactical formation of the Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) to support its efforts to formalize control over Russian irregular forces.
Russia continues efforts to integrate education systems in occupied Ukraine and expand education programs aimed at eliminating Ukrainian identity in occupied territories.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance near Kreminna and continued positional engagements with Ukrainian forces along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on December 30. Geolocated footage published on December 29 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced west of Dibrova (southwest of Kreminna).[39] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued in the Kupyansk direction near Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and Novoselivske (northwest of Svatove) and in the Lyman direction north of Hryhorivka (south of Kreminna), and near Makiivka (northwest of Kreminna), Torske (west of Kreminna), and the Serebryanske forest area (southwest of Kreminna).[40]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances northwest and southwest of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage published on December 30 indicates that Russian forces advanced on the northern and northeastern outskirts of Bohdanivka and northwest of Khromove (both northwest of Bakhmut).[41] Additional geolocated footage published on December 30 indicates that Russian forces advanced north of Klishchiivka (southwest of Bakhmut).[42] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northwest of Bakhmut near Hryhorivka, Khromove, and Bohdanivka; southwest of Bakhmut near Andriivka and Klishchiivka; and northwest of Horlivka near Shumy.[43] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly still operating northwest of Bakhmut.[44] Elements of the Russian 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly operating near Bakhmut.[45]
Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance on Avdiivka’s northern flank as positional engagements continued near Avdiivka on December 30. Geolocated footage published on December 30 indicates that Russian forces advanced north of Stepove (north of Avdiivka).[46] A Russian milblogger, citing alleged unspecified Ukrainian analysts, claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 370 meters in width and 250 meters in depth north of Avdiivka itself and marginally advanced towards the Novobakhmutivka-Ochertyne line northwest of Avdiivka.[47] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these various claims, however. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near the Avdiivka Coke Plant and Novobakhmutivka; north of Avdiivka near Stepove and west of Kamianka; southeast of Avdiivka near the industrial zone; and southwest of Avdiivka near Optyne, Sieverne, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske.[48] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces have been actively using about 100 drones a day for the past three days near Avdiivka but have reduced their use of artillery in the past day.[49] A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating near Avdiivka stated that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) and the 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) are attempting to advance into Stepove.[50]
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements west and southwest of Donetsk City, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline on December 30. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued near Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), Marinka, and Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[51]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting occurred near Pryyutne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on December 30.[52]
Russian forces continue efforts to regain previously lost positions near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 30, but there were no changes to the frontline in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced a kilometer in depth east of Robotyne on December 29, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[53] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated on December 30 that positional engagements continued west and north of Verbove (east of Robotyne), near Novofedorivka (northeast of Robotyne) and Novoprokopivka (south of Robotyne), west of Robotyne, and east of Kopani (northwest of Robotyne).[54] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on December 30 that in the past two to three days Russian forces have advanced near Verbove, Robotyne, and Kopani and have managed to almost eliminate the Ukrainian penetration of the current Russian main line of defense, which Ukrainian forces made in September 2023.[55] ISW recently observed a likely Ukrainian withdrawal in the area to more defensible positions closer to Robotyne, and Mashovets’ reporting is consistent with this observation.[56] Elements of the Russian 7th and 76th Airborne (VDV) Divisions, the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District), and the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating in the Robotyne area.[57]
Ukrainian forces maintain positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of December 30, but there were no changes to the frontline in the area. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that positional engagements continued on the east bank, including near Krynky.[58] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating on the east bank.[59] Mashovets stated that the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces recently withdrew elements of the 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) from the frontline for restoration.[60] ISW previously observed elements of the 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade operating on the east bank in August.[61]
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian naval drone three kilometers from Sevastopol Bay on December 30.[62]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The Russian military command reportedly continued the dissolution of the “Kaskad” operational combat tactical formation of the Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) to support its efforts to formalize control over Russian irregular forces. A Russian milblogger claimed on December 29 that Kaskad fighters would be leaving their frontline positions over the following 24 hours after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) disbanded and dissolved the formation.[63] The milblogger claimed that Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov visited occupied Donetsk Oblast on December 29 to check on Kaskad’s disbandment and on issues facing current Russian offensive operations in the area. The milblogger then added on December 30 that the Russian MoD has been disbanding Kaskad over the past four weeks in an effort to absorb its forces into BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) by removing Kaskad’s command and seizing all of its military equipment.[64] The milblogger claimed that Kaskad’s “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky hijacked Kaskad’s entire 5th Battalion and subordinated it to an unspecified Rosgvardia formation that does not participate in active combat.[65] Khodakovsky was appointed the deputy head of the Main Directorate of Rosgvardia in occupied Donetsk Oblast in February 2023 and commands Rosgvardia’s special rapid response and riot police (OMON and SOBR) in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[66] The milblogger added that the Russian military command tasked Russian military police with disarming Kaskad fighters and using force if they faced resistance. The milblogger quoted Kaskad servicemen as saying, “on the New Year’s holiday and ahead of presidential elections, those who defended Donbas from the first day received a gift — a shot in the back.”
Another Russian milblogger claimed that some Kaskad fighters attempted to deny these dissolution reports but are now framing them as a transfer to other units in BARS or Rosgvardia.[67] Another milblogger claimed that the Russian military command is keeping Kaskad fighters in the dark about their futures and claimed that it is unclear what will happen to the large sector of the frontline that Kaskad elements were previously responsible for — likely referring to the area near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast frontline.[68] The Vostok Battalion has not commented on reports of Kaskad’s dissolution since December 28, and Khodakovsky and Kaskad’s official Telegram channel have not announced or discussed these reports since they appeared in the Russian information space.[69] ISW assessed on December 28 that the dissolution of Kaskad is likely part of the Russian effort to formalize control over some irregular forces and that the dissolution or transfer of Kaskad forces will likely have implications for Kaskad’s ability to maintain its pre-formalization structure and may degrade its combat effectiveness.[70]
Russia continues to recruit and prepare additional irregular forces to support the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Russian state news wire TASS reported on December 29 that the “Hispaniola” Soccer Fan Volunteer Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade (part of the Redut private military company) established a new detachment specializing in the use of reconnaissance and kamikaze drones.[71] Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on December 30 that the second group of servicemen of the “Baysangur Benoyevsky” and “Sheikh Mansur” volunteer battalions completed combat training at the Russian Spetsnaz University in Gudermes, Chechnya, and noted that the third group of forces is currently undergoing training.[72] Kadyrov added that Chechen Republic is planning to have 600 personnel from these battalions complete training by the end of January 2024.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces used an L-504 decoy air defense complex for the first time when launching a Kh-101 missile over Ukraine on December 29.[73] The Russian 2001 patent for L-504 complexes claimed that the decoy reduces the likelihood of a missile being struck by air defenses by three times and can imitate a missile.[74]
Satellite imagery obtained on December 29 showed that Russian forces painted aircraft decoys at the Primorsko-Akhtarsk air base likely in an effort to defend Russian MiG-29 and Su-34 aircraft from drone strikes.[75]
The Central Territorial Directorate of Rosaviatsiya (Russian Federal Air Transport Agency) reportedly visited Kalashnikov concern subsidiary Zala Aero to inspect the development of a new Z-16 drone that can conduct surveillance at any time of the day and can reach speeds of 110 kilometers per hour.[76]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Russia continues efforts to integrate education systems in occupied Ukraine and expand education programs aimed at eliminating Ukrainian identity in occupied territories. The Russian Ministry of Science and Higher Education reported on December 29 that universities in occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts will receive 28,500 scholarship positions out of a total 620,500 scholarship positions in Russia for the 2024 to 2025 academic school year.[77] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on December 30 that Russian occupation officials in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, are creating mandatory lessons stressing Russian cultural identity for Ukrainian children.[78]
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian UN Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya repeated boilerplate Russian rhetoric promoting doubt in continued Western support for Ukraine at an UN Security Council meeting on December 29. Nebenzya claimed that Ukraine should expect “the worst news” in the near future regardless of whether or not the US and European Union (EU) approve new military and financial assistance packages to Ukraine.[79] Nebenzya claims aim to question continued Western support for Ukraine while also framing Western support as futile.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko approved the 2024 budget for the Union State on December 29. Union State Secretary of State Dmitri Mezentsev reported that Belarus and Russia agreed to increase their contributions to the Union State budget by 38 percent.[80] Mezentsev also stated that the Union State will expand technology, defense, and security programs and will increase cultural, humanitarian, educational, and patriotic events in 2024.[81]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
This is a locator map for Afghanistan with its capital, Kabul. (AP Photo)
ISLAMABAD (AP) — Security forces in Afghanistan killed a number of Tajik and Pakistani nationals and arrested scores others involved in attacks against religious clerics, the public, and mosques, a senior Taliban official said Sunday.
Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid, Taliban’s appointed defense minister, during a press conference in the capital, Kabul, said dozens of Tajiks and more than 20 Pakistanis were killed in the past 12 months “in operations by security forces.”
He said scores of Tajiks and hundreds of Pakistanis involved in various incidents were also arrested during that period.
Mujahid called on neighboring and regional countries to strictly monitor their borders.
Tensions between Kabul and Islamabad spiked as hundreds of thousands of Afghans left Pakistan after authorities started pursuing foreigners they said were in the country illegally, going door-to-door to check migrants’ documentation, following an Oct.31 deadline.
Mujahid also said there has been a 90% decrease in attacks by an Islamic State group affiliate in the past year.
The militant group has carried out major assaults on schools, hospitals, and mosques, and has also attacked Shiite areas across the country.
The IS affiliate has been a major rival of the Taliban since the latter seized control of Afghanistan in August 2021. IS militants have struck in Kabul, in northern provinces and especially wherever there are Shiites, whom IS considers to be apostates.
Annika Ganzeveld, Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, and Nicholas Carl
Information Cutoff: 2:00pm EST
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.
Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Key Takeaways:
Palestinian militias continued to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods of Gaza City. Israeli forces continued executing tasks consistent with holding operations in some areas of Gaza City. Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Beit Lahiya and Sheikh Radwan in the northern Gaza Strip.
Palestinian militias are launching attacks from civilian-populated areas of al Bureij as Israeli forces advance clearing operations in the Central Governorate. Palestinian militias claimed several attacks on Israeli forces north and east of al Bureij, which is consistent with CTP-ISW’s observation that the IDF appears to be isolating Hamas’ Bureij Battalion and other Palestinian militias there before reducing them.
The IDF continued to make ground advances in and around Khan Younis. At least five Palestinian militias attempted to defend against Israeli advances into Khan Younis. Palestinian militia fighters attacked Israeli forces south of Khan Younis.
Hamas and PFLP officials messaged a unified and positive position on the Egyptian peace proposal and accused Israel of spreading disinformation about the negotiations.
Palestinian fighters conducted at least two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel.
Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in three locations across the West Bank.
Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
The Axis of Resistance may escalate further against US forces in the region around the four-year anniversary of the US killing Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2024. The IRGC Quds Force is engaging with senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia and political leaders likely to discuss their military and political campaign to expel US forces.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani ordered the opening of Celebration Square in Baghdad’s Green Zone for New Year’s Eve.
10. The Islamic Resistance of Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for three attacks targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria.
11. The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties—is conducting a series of political maneuvers to try to increase its political influence in Basra.
12. Israel was likely responsible for a series of airstrikes targeting Aleppo International Airport and Iranian and Iranian-backed targets in Albu Kamal, Syria, to interdict Iranian weapons shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah.
13. The Houthi military spokesperson warned the United States against “escalating” with the Houthis and rallying other nations to protect Israeli shipping.
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.
Palestinian militias continued to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods of Gaza City on December 30. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it was operating in Daraj and Tuffah on December 21.[1] Palestinian militias have since then claimed several attacks on Israeli forces attempting to clear the remaining areas in the northern Gaza Strip. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—published footage on December 29 of its fighters firing rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli tanks from destroyed buildings in Darraj and Tuffah.[2] The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—fired tandem charged anti-tank rockets and RPGs at Israeli tanks and troop carriers as Israeli forces advanced into the neighborhoods.[3] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—fired tandem charged anti-tank rockets and RPGs at an Israeli tank and bulldozer in Tuffah.[4]
Israeli forces continued executing tasks consistent with holding operations in some areas of Gaza City. CTP-ISW reported on December 20 that Israeli forces are transitioning from clearing operations to holding operations in some areas of the northern Gaza Strip.[5] Violence decreases during a hold phase but is not absent, as the holding force seeks the complete destruction of the enemy force.[6]Palestinian attacks in these areas demonstrate that the militias have retained some forces capable of targetingIsraeli operations.
Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters on December 30 in Sheikh Ijlin neighborhood for the first time since mid-November.[7] Israeli forces initially advanced toward the neighborhood in southern Gaza City in mid-November.[8] The al Qassem Brigades conducted several attacks, including a complex attack in which its fighters detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) in the path of two Israeli vehicles and subsequently engaged Israeli ground forces.[9]
Israeli forces identified Palestinian fighters operating near them in Shujaiya, according to an IDF report on December 30.[10] The IDF stated that it established “operational control” of Shujaiya on December 21 after dismantling Hamas’ battalion there.[11]
Israeli forces engaged in a multi-hour battle with Palestinian fighters in Gaza City, according to an IDF report on December 30.[12] Israeli air forces killed more than 15 Palestinian fighters in less than three hours.[13] Israeli ground forces engaged Palestinian fighters following the airstrikes.[14]
The al Qassem Brigades and al Quds Brigades conducted a combined operation firing mortars and rockets at an Israeli combat outpost southeast of Zaytoun neighborhood in Gaza City on December 30.[15] The Hamas Zaytoun Battalion commander is one of the three remaining commanders in the Gaza City Brigade, who held their current positions before the war began, according to Israeli reports on December 21.[16]
Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Beit Lahiya and Sheikh Radwan in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli forces destroyed two Hamas-affiliated buildings in Beit Lahiya and found a large quantity of weapons, including explosive devices.[17] The IDF identified two Palestinian fighters observing Israeli forces from a building and directed tank fire at their position.[18] The al Qassem Brigades claimed that its fighters clashed with Israeli special operations forces and detonated a Shawaz explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting an Israeli tank in Sheikh Radwan on December 30.[19] Palestinian militias have claimed nearly daily attacks in Sheikh Radwan neighborhood since the humanitarian pause expired on December 1, suggesting that it is one of the remaining areas with significant Palestinian militia defensive capabilities in the northern Gaza Strip.
Palestinian militias are launching attacks from civilian-populated areas of al Bureij as Israeli forces advance clearing operations in the Central Governorate. Israeli forces received intelligence on December 28 that Hamas fighters were hiding inside a school where civilians were sheltering in southern al Bureij.[20] Palestinian fighters fired RPGs and small arms at Israeli forces while hiding behind women and children inside the school, according to the IDF.[21] Israeli forces raided the school and cleared the building of Palestinian fighters.[22] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said that Hamas continues to use civilians as human shields, which intentionally puts these civilians in harm’s way, to protect Hamas’ military infrastructure and weapons.[23] Israeli forces in a separate instance encountered Hamas fighters, who launched attacks from civilian sites in al Bureij.[24]
Palestinian militias claimed several attacks on Israeli forces north and east of al Bureij, which is consistent with CTP-ISW’s observation that the IDF appears to be isolating Hamas’ Bureij Battalion and other Palestinian militias there before reducing them.[25] The al Qassem Brigades conducted several attacks on Israeli forces in the area, including claiming to use a Shawaz EFP to target an Israeli tank north of al Bureij.[26] Israeli forces face other Palestinian militias in the central Gaza Strip. The al Nasser Salah al Din Brigades—the militant wing of the Popular Resistance Committees—claimed that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces north of al Bureij.[27] The al Quds Brigades detonated an unspecified explosive device targeting an Israeli military vehicle east of al Bureij.[28] The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the militant wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—claimed to fire tandem-charge anti-tank rockets at Israeli forces east of Bureij as well.[29]
The IDF continued to make ground advances in and around Khan Younis on December 30. The IDF said it began ground maneuvers deeper into southern Khan Younis on December 30, a day after it said it was expanding operations there.[30] The IDF 98th Division conducted around 50 airstrikes as part of shaping operations to enable ground force maneuvers.[31] Shaping operations conducted through airstrikes change the operational environment in urban areas to favor Israeli clearing operations on the ground.[32] The 7th Brigade Combat Team raided a Hamas military intelligence headquarters in central Khan Younis as part of the clearing operations.[33] Israeli forces also found an al Quds Brigades operations room inside the Hamas compound.[34] This raid could degrade the defensive capabilities of Hamas’ Khan Younis Battalion and al Quds Brigades forces in Khan Younis. Israeli forces separately clashed with Palestinian fighters as Israeli air support struck fighters, weapons manufacturing sites, and a Hamas stronghold in Khan Younis.[35] The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said on December 30 that intensified clashes in Khan Younis and Deir al Balah have caused at least 100,000 internally displaced people to arrive in Rafah in recent days.[36]
At least five Palestinian militias attempted to defend against Israeli advances into Khan Younis on December 30. The al Qassem Brigades conducted several attacks on Israeli armor and dismounted infantry on December 30, including sophisticated house-borne IED and EFP attacks.[37] Fighters from the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and the Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades fired anti-tank shells and small arms at Israeli armor and dismounted infantry on the advancing line in Khan Younis.[38] National Resistance Brigades fighters clashed with Israeli forces in central Khan Younis.[39] The al Quds Brigades mortared Israeli positions in north and east of Khan Younis.[40]
Palestinian militia fighters attacked Israeli forces south of Khan Younis on December 30.The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, al Qassem Brigades, and National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli forces in Khuzaa, southeast of Khan Younis.[41] The IDF began clearing operations in Khuzaa on December 27.[42] The al Qassem Brigades fired an anti-tank shell at Israeli armor in Khuzaa.[43] The al Qassem Brigades and al Quds Brigades each mortared Israeli forces east of Rafah as well.[44]
Hamas and PFLP officials messaged a unified and positive position on the Egyptian peace proposal and accused Israel of spreading disinformation about the negotiations on December 30. Israeli media said that Hamas had “agreed in principle” to the release of further hostages in exchange for a month-long pause in fighting, in contrast to Hamas’ previous position requiring the complete cessation of the conflict.[45] Hamas political officials abroad, such asOsama Hamdan and Hossam Badran, and senior PFLP official Maher Mezher rebuked the claim from Israeli media.[46] Hamdan reiterated that Hamas will only release the Israeli hostages once Israel stops its operation in the Gaza Strip.[47] Badran said that Hamas is discussing all peace proposals with the various factions but that hostages will only be released after the war ends.[48] Mezher said that the Palestinian political factions will deliver an amended proposal to Egypt in the coming days after they met to discuss and revise the Egyptian peace deal proposal on December 27.[49]. Mezher said that the Egyptian proposal is “suitable to be a cornerstone” of a deal.[50] The Israeli security cabinet has indicated that it will not seriously consider the Egyptian three-phase peace plan, as the Egyptian plan would prevent Israel from achieving its stated war aims and is therefore tantamount to a defeat for Israel.[51] The Egyptian proposal would form a transitional government in the Gaza Strip that would include “various Palestinian factions, including Hamas.”[52] Mezher and Hamdan claimed that Israel leaked the story to harm the united Palestinian front against the war and mislead Israelis about the release of hostages due to internal political pressure.[53] The Palestinian leaderships‘ recent comments are consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that both Hamas’ political leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar and Hamas’ external political leaders seek to use their Israeli hostages as leverage to maintain their influence in negotiations.[54]
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu reaffirmed his commitment to pursuing his stated objectives in the war against Hamas and his preparedness to fight for many months on December 30. Netanyahu held a press conference and declared that “the war will continue for many more months.”[55] He also reiterated that Israel would fight until the elimination of Hamas and the release of all hostages.[56] He stated the IDF is employing new methods in the northern, central, and southern Gaza Strip.[57] Netanyahu had further clarified his war objectives of destroying Hamas, demilitarizing Gaza, and deradicalizing “Palestinian society” in a Wall Street Journal op-ed on December 26.[58]
Palestinian fighters conducted at least two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on December 30. The al Quds Brigades claimed two rocket attacks targeting southern Israel on December 30.[59] The al Qassem Brigades published footage of its fighters firing approximately ten rockets into unspecified areas of Israel on December 29.[60]
Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
West Bank
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there
Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in three locations across the West Bank on December 30. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that it detonated an IED against an unspecified target in Azzun, east of Qalqilya.[61] Hamas praised a car-ramming attack that injured an IDF soldier near Hebron.[62] Palestinian security forces dismantled planted IEDs in Jenin on December 30.[63] Israeli forces conducted raids to arrest wanted Palestinians near Ramallah.[64]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel
Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on December 30. LH fired rockets and anti-tank guided missiles toward three Israeli border positions.[65] LH also claimed that it attacked an Israeli military position in Shebaa Farms with one-way attack drones.[66] Unspecified fighters separately launched rockets toward Yiftah on December 30.[67]
Israeli politicians continue to emphasize that LH must withdraw from Lebanon’s border with Israel. Israeli war cabinet member and former Defense Minister Benny Gantz stated in a call with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz that Israel cannot tolerate the threat that LH poses and that LH must withdraw from the border for the sake of regional stability.[68] The chairman of Israeli political party Israel Beitenu and former Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman separately called for Israel to control southern Lebanon up to the Litani River until the Lebanese government can exercise its sovereignty over the area.[69]
Iran and Axis of Resistance
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts
The Axis of Resistance may escalate further against US forces in the region around the four-year anniversary of the US killing Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2024. The United States killed Soleimani and his top Iraqi lieutenant, Abu Mehdi al Muhandis, in an airstrike at the Baghdad International Airport in 2020.[70] Iranian leaders have vowed to expel US forces from the region as part of their revenge for the United States killing Soleimani.[71] Iranian-backed militias have conducted an abnormally high rate of attacks around the anniversary of Soleimani’s and Muhandis’ deaths ever year except for the anniversary in January 2023.[72] The absence of an Iranian-led escalation around January 2023 is unsurprising given that the Iranian regime was focused heavily on internal security in the aftermath of the Mahsa Amini protest movement at the time. Iranian proxy and partner militias have conducted a concerted attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria in recent months as part of Tehran’s effort to expel US forces, as CTP-ISW has reported extensively. The coincidence of this campaign with the anniversary of Soleimani’s and Muhandis’ deaths presents an increased risk to American servicemembers in the Middle East during this period.
The IRGC Quds Force is engaging with senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia and political leaders likely to discuss their military and political campaign to expel US forces.The Iranian Embassy in Baghdad organized a ceremony to honor Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mehdi al Muhandis on December 30.[73] The following senior Iranian and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors attended the ceremony:
Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem al-e Sadegh[74]
Former Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General and current Poplar Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz al Muhammadawi[75]
PMF Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh[76]
Former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki[77]
The presence of al-e Sadegh is noteworthy given that he is a senior IRGC Quds Force officer. Iranian leaders have long appointed such officers as ambassador to Iraq, highlighting the degree to which the IRGC Quds Force controls and influences Iranian policy toward Iraq. These officers who dual hat as diplomats to Iraq serve as key liaisons between Iranian and Iraqi military and political leaders.
The presence of Mohammadawi and Fayyadh is noteworthy given their influential roles over Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. The PMF is an Iraqi security service containing numerous Iranian-backed Shia militias.[78] Several of these militias, such as Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, are members of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The Islamic Resistance of Iraq has conducted almost daily attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria in recent weeks as part of their campaign to expel US forces.
IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani appeared to speak on behalf of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in a speech on December 29. Ghaani warned that militias will “put aside their considerations” and “respond” to the United States if the United States continues its “irrational behavior” in Iraq.[79] Ghaani was likely referring to the self-defense strikes that the United States has conducted on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias when he referred to “irrational behavior.” Ghaani ignored in this statement that the United States has a legitimate right to self-defense as it operates in Iraq to fight ISIS at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government. Ghaani’s comment is especially noteworthy given that the IRGC Quds Force—and he as its commander—directs, manages, and supports the Iraqi Shia militias that have been conducting the attack campaign to expel US forces. The IRGC Quds Forces provide military equipment, funding, and training to its proxies and partners throughout the region to support Iran’s pursuit of its strategic objectives, which include expelling the United States from the region.[80] Ghaani’s remark belies repeated claims by Iranian officials that “resistance groups” in the Middle East act independently.[81]
Iranian-backed political actors continued to call for the removal of US forces from Iraq in statements on December 30. Iraqi militia leaders and politicians have increased their calls for the expulsion of US forces since the United States conducted self-defense strikes on three Kataib Hezbollah facilities in Hillah, Babil Province, on December 25.
Nouri al Maliki claimed that US forces in Iraq have transformed “from advisory forces into killers” and that the Iraqi people will not accept the presence of foreign forces in Iraq during a speech at the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad.[82] Maliki’s claims echo similar ones from other Iranian-backed Iraqi actors that the presence of US forces in Iraq threatens Iraqi security and stability.[83] US advisory forces are currently deployed in Iraq for counter-ISIS operations at the invitation of the Iraqi government and provide planning, operational, intelligence, logistical, and fire support to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).[84] CTP-ISW previously assessed that an Iraqi decision to expel US forces will very likely create space for ISIS to rapidly resurge in Syria within 12 to 24 months and then threaten Iraq.[85] The ISF still faces significant deficiencies in logistics, intelligence, and fire support that inhibit its ability to defeat ISIS alone.[86]
A member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political wing, Ali Turki, stated that “dirty American hands” cannot shed the blood of the PMF and ISF.[87] Turki called on the Iraqi federal government to expedite the expulsion of US forces from Iraq.
A member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization’s political wing, Faleh al Khazali, separately stated that the presence of US forces in Iraq is “unjustified” because of the presence of 1.6 million Iraqi security personnel in the country.[88] Other Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians, including Mohammad Shia Sudani, have similarly cited Iraqi forces’ “increased capabilities” as justification for the removal of US forces.[89]
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani ordered the opening of Celebration Square in Baghdad’s Green Zone for New Year’s Eve.[90] Sudani ordered that the gates of the Green Zone, where the US Embassy and other government and highly sensitive facilities are located, remain open for an unspecified amount of time after midnight on December 31. PIJ and Hamas-affiliated Quds News Network separately called for demonstrations in front of US embassies across the world on New Year’s Eve to demand an end to “Israeli aggression” in the Gaza Strip.[91]
The Islamic Resistance of Iraq claimed responsibility for three attacks targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria on December 29 and 30.[92]The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a rocket attack targeting US forces at al Shaddadi, Hasakah Province, Syria. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed two separate one-way drone attacks targeting US forces at al Harir airbase in Erbil Province, Iraq.
The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties—is conducting a series of political maneuvers to try to increase its political influence in Basra. Basra is an important Shia stronghold in southern Iraq. Current Basra Governor Asaad al Eidani’s political party, the Design Alliance, won 12 out of 23 seats in the recent provincial council elections.[93] Informed sources told an independent Iraqi news outlet that members of the Shia Coordination Framework are lobbying the Iraqi judiciary to rule that a majority of seats in Basra requires 13—not 12—seats.[94] Such a decision would deprive Eidani’s party of a majority. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have historically co-opted elements of the judiciary to politically benefit themselves and disadvantage opponents, especially in recent years.[95] The independent Iraqi outlet reported that the Shia Coordination Framework is suspicious of Eidani’s ties to rival Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr. Sadr has previously praised Eidani and members of the Design Alliance.[96]
Israel was likely responsible for a series of airstrikes targeting Aleppo International Airport and Iranian and Iranian-backed targets in Albu Kamal, Syria, on December 29-30 to interdict Iranian weapons shipments to LH. Western and Israeli media reported and several social media accounts circulated reports of the airstrikes.[97] An unspecified American military official denied to Western media that the United States conducted any self-defense strikes.[98] The Syrian Defense Ministry claimed that the airstrike at Aleppo damaged the airport.[99] Israel has historically conducted airstrikes on major Syrian airports to prevent Iranian weapons deliveries to proxy and partner militias in Syria and Lebanon.[100] CTP-ISW has previously written on how the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) uses Iranian regime-affiliated airliners to transport military equipment and personnel to the Levant.[101] The likely Israeli airstrikes at Albu Kamal reportedly hit IRGC and Iranian-backed targets, including weapons depots and truck convoys as they crossed from Iraq into Syria. Those airstrikes killed several Iranian-backed militants, according to social media claims and Western and Israeli media reports. Israeli media reported that the airstrikes at Albu Kamal killed four LH members who were members of a unit responsible for transferring military technologies and weapons from Iran to Lebanon.[102] An Israeli social media account reported that Israel also targeted an IRGC Quds Force unit with similar responsibilities in the same strikes.[103]
The airstrikes follow reports that Israel has targeted IRGC and IRGC-affiliated actors that are trying to prepare LH for a wider conflict with Israel in recent weeks. Israeli media reported that an Israeli airstrike on the Damascus International Airport on December 28 was meant to interdict Iranian weapons transfers to LH.[104] An Israeli airstrike on the IRGC military headquarters in Sayyidah Zainab, Syria, on December 25 killed a senior IRGC commander who oversaw Iranian materiel support to LH.[105] Israeli media further reported that Iran has accelerated its weapons transfers to LH in anticipation of a wider war with Israel.[106]
The IDF stated that unspecified actors fired two rockets from Syria toward northern Israel following the most recent airstrikes on Albu Kumal.[107] This attack is unsurprising given that unspecified actors have repeatedly conducted small-scale indirect fire attacks into Israel immediately in response to Israeli airstrikes in Syria since the Israel-Hamas war began.
The Houthi military spokesperson warned the United States against “escalating” with the Houthis and rallying other nations to protect Israeli shipping on December 29. Brigadier General Yahya Sarea emphasized the Houthis’ defensive readiness and commitment to the Palestinian cause, which is consistent with prior Houthi rhetoric.[108] The Houthis have conducted an anti-shipping attack campaign around the Red Sea in recent weeks to disrupt commercial shipping to Israel and demonstrate both the willingness and capability of the Axis of Resistance to disrupt maritime traffic around strategic maritime chokepoints.[109] The United States announced Operation Prosperity Guardian on December 18 to counter Houthi attacks on international shipping.[110]
Senior Iranian military and political officials attended a commemoration ceremony for IRGC Brigadier General Razi Mousavi, whom Israel killed in an airstrike in Syria, on December 30.[111]The Iranian regime previously held a funeral ceremony for Mousavi on December 28.[112] Western and anti-regime media have reported that Mousavi headed IRGC Quds Force Unit 2250, which manages Iranian weapons shipments to LH and Iranian-backed militias in Syria.[113] Many high-ranking IRGC officials attended the most recent commemoration ceremony, including:
IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami;
IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh;
IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Pak Pour;
IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani; and
IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Fallah Zadeh.
Other notable attendees included Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, Interior Minister and former IRGC Quds Force officer Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan, and former IRGC commanders Major General Mohammad Ali “Aziz” Jafari and Major General Mohsen Rezaei. The presence of such senior Iranian military and political officials at Mousavi’s commemoration ceremony and funeral highlights his prominence in the regime and its regional project.
Army personnel travelling in a military vehicle in this undated picture. — ISPR/File
At least five terrorists were killed in an exchange of fire with security forces during an intelligence-based operation (IBO) in the Mashkai area of Balochistan’s Awaran district Saturday night, the military’s media wing said on Sunday.
The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) said security forces conducted the IBO on the reported presence of terrorists.
“During the conduct of the operation, after intense fire exchange between own troops and the terrorists, five terrorists were sent to hell. Terrorists’ hideout was also busted and a cache of arms, ammunition and explosives was recovered,” the ISPR said.
It said the sanitisation operation was being carried out to eliminate any other terrorists found in the area.
The military’s media wing said the security forces of Pakistan, in step with the nation, remained determined to thwart attempts to sabotage the peace, stability and progress of Balochistan.
A day earlier, the ISPR said five terrorists including a terrorist commander were killed in an IBO in Mir Ali area of district North Waziristan on Friday.
The military’s media wing had said security forces conducted the IBO on the reported presence of terrorists on December 29.
“During the conduct of operation, after intense fire exchange, five terrorists, including terrorist commander Rahzaib aka Khuray, were sent to hell,” the ISPR stated.
‘2023 saw disturbing surge in suicide attacks’
Pakistan, in 2023, saw a disturbing surge in suicide attacks by terrorists, reaching the highest level since 2014.
The data gathered by PICSS stated that security forces remained the primary targets of these terrorist attacks, with civilians constituting the second-largest victim category.
At least 48% of deaths (157) and 58% of injuries (340) were inflicted upon security personnel, the data stated. The number of civilian casualties was closer to these statistics with 130 deaths and 242 injured.
As per regional comparisons, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa bore the brunt of these attacks, reporting 23 instances that resulted in 254 fatalities and 512 injuries.
Within KP, newly merged districts (NMD) experienced 13 suicide attacks, leading to 85 deaths and 206 injuries. Balochistan faced five attacks, causing 67 deaths and 52 injuries, while Sindh witnessed one suicide attack resulting in eight deaths and 18 injuries.
wardogsclub.wordpress.com 